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RLUIPA AND MOSQUES: ENFORCING A




It is in the nature of legislation that Congress often cannot
predict the precise factual scenarios where the principles set forth in a
law will be applied. Sometimes problems that were barely on the radar
screen of legislators may prove to be the key beneficiaries. If the
operative principles of legislation are sound, the application to
unanticipated situations will be seamless. Indeed that is generally how it
should be-the Framers of the Constitution, in barring practices such as
Bills of Attainder, sought to ensure that legislation would tend to serve
broad rather than narrow ends.
One frequently sees this characteristic of legislation at work in
civil rights statutes. Section 19832 was enacted as the Civil Rights Act of
1871 to try to help ensure that newly freed slaves in the South were
protected by local officials from violence at the hands of the Ku Klux
Klan and given the equal treatment protection of the law that the
Constitution guaranteed them. However, its broad language providing a
remedy for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities" 4 by
states acting under color of law has resulted in its becoming a major
vehicle for enforcement of constitutional protections generally.
*Special Counsel for Religious Discrimination, U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division. J.D., Magna Cum Laude Harvard Law School, 1992, B.A.,
Magna Cum Laude, Amherst College, 1988.
1. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 44 (James Madison).
2. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1871).
3. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 8.1, at 377.
This has been true in recent years in the area of religious
freedom legislation. The Church Arson Prevention Act6 was passed in
1996 in response to an upsurge of arson against churches, particularly
African-American churches. Despite its popular name's focus on
churches, it makes it a crime to "intentionally deface[ ], damage[ ], or
destroy[ ] any religious real property."8 In the wake of 9/11, attacks on
mosques, virtually unheard of prior to 9/11, rose sharply in the months
afterward. 9 The Church Arson Prevention Act, has proven to be an
invaluable law enforcement tool in responding to the increased violence
against mosques.'o
The same is true with the land use provisions of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), passed in
2000.11 RLUIPA was enacted, as will be discussed in detail in Section I
below, to address the problem of local governments applying zoning and
landmarking powers in a manner that either discriminated against places
of worship and religious schools, or imposed substantial burdens on their
religious exercise.12 While there are a few isolated references to mosques
in the voluminous legislative history, and a number of general references
to minority religions, the overwhelming focus in the legislative history is
6. 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2002).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 247.
9. Eric Treene, Federal Enforcement and Outreach, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN
WARTIME: THE PosT-9/11 SIKH EXPERIENCE 187, 190 n.62 (Dawinder S. Sidhu &
Neha Singh Gohil eds., 2009).
10. See, e.g., id at 189-90 (discussing the steep rise in hate crimes against
Muslims after 9/11, including 'attacks on mosques, and the government's initial
response); Civil Rights Division Post 9-11 Enforcement and Outreach, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.php (last visited Feb. 2,
2012).
11. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. (2006). This article only addresses the land use
provisions of RLUIPA. For descriptions of the history, purpose, and application of
the institutionalized persons provisions, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS ACT (Sept. 22, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/crt/rluipareport
092210.pdf. See also Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success
and Constitutionality of RLUIPA's Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
501, 505-06 (2005).
12. See infra Section I.
20121 RLUIPA AND MOSQUES 331
on churches and, to a lesser extent, synagogues." The Joint Statement of
Senate sponsors Hatch and Kennedy refers primarily to "churches" in
describing the problem being addressed, and how the various provisions
of the law would operate.14
However, as with the Church Arson Prevention Act, RLU[PA is
proving to be an important statute for protecting the civil rights of
Muslims in America. As will be described below, Muslims have faced
considerable opposition to efforts to build or expand mosques or
religious schools.'" And this has intensified in the past two years. For
example, the Department of Justice has opened twenty-seven RLUIPA
matters involving mosques and Muslim schools since RLUIPA was
passed. Of these, seventeen have been opened since May of 2010. Civil
rights groups have likewise reported a significant increase in conflicts
involving mosques recently.
This article will explore the problems faced by Muslim
communities in the United States in land use issues since the passage of
RLUIPA, and how RLUIPA can be a powerful tool for ensuring
realization of the constitutional right to equal opportunities to build
places of worship and religious schools. The provisions of RLUIPA are
not uniquely helpful to Muslims. Indeed, the record of RLUIPA's
application in the first eleven years is one of broadly facilitating religious
exercise of a wide range of religious groups. The majority of cases, as
one would expect in a Christian-majority country, involve churches and
Christian schools. But in light of the growing hostility toward
construction and expansion of Muslim houses of worship, RLUIPA is an
increasingly critical tool for protecting the civil rights of Muslim
Americans.
Section I will describe the purposes behind passage of RLUIPA.
While, as noted, the record focused on churches and synagogues, and
mosques received barely a mention, Congress expressed particular
concern with ensuring the ability of newer and smaller religious
organizations to locate places of worship, whether small independent
Bible churches operating in storefronts or minority religious
13. See infa Section 1.
14. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
15. See infra Section 11.
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institutions.16 To protect the right of religious freedom in land use,
Congress chose a broad remedial statute that protected against
discrimination among religious groups. RLUIPA requires equal
treatment between secular and religious use; it ensures that places of
worship are not completely zoned out of jurisdictions or unreasonably
limited in them; and it provides a mechanism to ensure that the
constitutional right to be free from unjustifiably burdensome
infringements on religious freedom is preserved.17 Section II describes
the headwind of intolerance that mosques and Muslim religious schools
currently face, and how that has been manifested in zoning disputes.18
Finally, Section III explores the various operational provisions of
RLUIPA, describing developments in the law, how these issues have
arisen in cases involving mosques, and how the various provisions of
RLUIPA are likely to impact Muslim civil rights cases moving
forward.19
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF RLUIPA
RLUIPA, fittingly for the present discussion of the protection of
the right of Muslims to build mosques, has its origins in a landmark
constitutional case involving a minority religion.
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court had granted exemptions under
the Free Exercise Clause to generally applicable laws that were facially
neutral toward religion, but which nonetheless burdened those with
religious practices or scruples conflicting with the law.20 Where the
Court found the burden on an individual's beliefs to outweigh the state's
interest, the individual received an exemption.2 1 Since those with
religious practices that are different from the majority are more likely to
see conflict between these practices and legal norms, this doctrine
22typically aided the religious practices of minority faiths. Thus in
16. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Section II.
19. See infra Section III.
20. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith




Wisconsin v. Yoder 23 the Court upheld a Free Exercise Clause challenge
by Amish parents against the state of Wisconsin's compulsory education
law, finding the Amish's longstanding practice of providing vocational
training in community to their older children was rooted in their religious
beliefs and outweighed the state's asserted interest in ensuring an
24 25
educated citizenry. Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held
that a Seventh-day Adventist who was fired by her employer for refusing
26
to work on Saturdays could not be denied unemployment benefits. The
state could not advance a compelling interest, narrowly tailored to
27
achieve its objective, overriding her need to observe the Sabbath. This
principle even applied to minorities within minorities, as in the case of a
Jehovah's Witness fired for refusing to build tank turrets even though
other Jehovah's Witnesses did not have a conscientious objection to this
activity.28 In other cases, the state interest were found to override the
religious claimant's interest in an exemption, such as an Orthodox
Jewish Air Force psychologist who sought to wear a yarmulke with his
uniform,29 Native American parents who objected on religious grounds
to the use of a Social Security number for their child in order to obtain
government welfare benefits, 30 and Amish workers who objected to
paying into the U.S. Social Security retirement system.3 1
However, in 1990, the Supreme Court issued a decision,
32Employment Division v. Smith, that cut back on the ability of
individuals to claim a right to exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause
to "neutral law[s] of general applicability."33 The Court in Smith rejected
the claim of Native Americans denied unemployment compensation after
23. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. Id. at 234-35.
25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. Id. at 406-07.
27. Id. at 403-04, 406-07.
28. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 710-
11(1981).
29. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
30. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986).
31. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-61 (1982).
32. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
33. Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)). See
also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2-3;
Michael W. McConnell, supra note 20.
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being fired for using the sacramental drug Peyote in violation of the
criminal laws.34 The Court held that claims for religious accommodations
to general laws are, for the most part, not to be considered constitutional
issues but rather must be sought from legislatures.35 The only cases in
which a religious objector could seek a constitutional exemption to a
neutral, generally applicable law, the Court held, were those that fell into
one of two categories. First, cases involving a "hybrid situation" of
religion joined with another fundamental right, such as religion plus
parental rights or religion plus speech, could receive heightened scruity.3 6
Second, where laws involve "individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct," as in unemployment case like
Sherbert v. Verner,37 such laws should not be deemed generally
applicable, because they already permit citizens to be exempted from the
law for secular reasons.38 The Smith majority acknowledged that leaving
religious accommodation to the political process would "place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in," but this is an "unavoidable consequence of democratic
government." 39
The Smith decision was met with widespread criticism from
religious communities, resulting in a broad, bipartisan and interfaith
effort to enact legislation that fully protected individuals and religious
organizations from unjustified and substantial burdens on their religious
exercise.4 0 The resulting statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"),41 provided very simply that no government may
34. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 881-82.
37. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. See also Church of Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542-45 (finding animal cruelty law to be not a law of
general applicability due to numerous exceptions and applying heightened scrutiny
to uphold Free Exercise claim of Santarians engaging in animal sacrifice).
39. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
40. See generally Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to
Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 929, 942 (2001); see also
Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons From
RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 717, 739 (2008).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
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"substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability" unless it is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest pursued in the least restrictive
means 42-essentially codifying the pre-Smith balancing test in all
situations through legislation.
The Supreme Court overturned RFRA's application to the states
in City of Boerne v. Flores,43 holding that Congress had exceeded its
power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to enforce due process
and equal protection of law. The Court held that Congress had created a
new rule of decision rather than enforcing existing constitutional
protections, finding that RFRA lacked "congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end." 45
In response to the Boerne decision, Congress considered bills in
1998 and 1999, both styled "The Religious Liberty Protection Act"
("RLPA"),46 that attempted to apply the strict scrutiny standard of RFRA
to as broad a group as possible of state laws that would meet the
requirements of Boerne for Enforcement Clause legislation, or fall within
Congress's Commerce Clause or Spending Clause powers.47 RLPA was
eventually narrowed to focus on two areas, laws involving zoning and
landmarking, and the rights of persons confined to institutions, and was
reintroduced as The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act on July 13, 2000.48
Congress gathered documentation of government infringement
on religious exercise through application of land use laws in nine
42. Id. at § 2000bb-1.
43. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
44. Id. at 536. RFRA continues to apply to the federal government since it
simply serves as a limitation on the reach of other validly enacted legislation. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423
(2006).
45. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
46. H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
47. See Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 40, at 943.
48. The narrowing of the legislation was based on both the policy concerns of
the broad coalition pushing for the legislation and the strength of the legislative
record in these areas. See id
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hearings over three years.49 Over the course of those hearings, Congress
amassed what the Senate sponsors termed "massive evidence" of a
pattern of religious discrimination in state and local land-use decisions.so
The House Report likewise described the situation as a "consistent,
widespread pattern of political and governmental resistance to a core
feature of religious exercise: the ability to assemble for worship."' In
reaching these conclusions, RLUIPA's sponsors relied on statistical
52
evidence such as surveys of cases and studies of zoning codes, as well
as anecdotal evidence from a broad range of local, regional, and national
experts in religious land use matters who testified that these examples
were representative of the unconstitutional discrimination that they had
witnessed in their experiences. 53 This statistical and anecdotal evidence
was "cumulative and mutually reinforcing evidence" of discrimination,
and amounted to a "substantial record of evidence indicating a
widespread pattern of religious discrimination in land use regulation." 5
Congress heard testimony that zoning processes lack consistent
application of standards and are "often vague, discretionary, and
subjective. The evidence Congress amassed indicated that zoning
regulations systems placed religious groups' ability to assemble for
worship "within the complete discretion of land use regulators."57 The
House Report further concluded that "[r]egulators typically have
49. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 17-24 (1999)
(summarizing testimony).
50. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75; H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 21-24; see also
Douglas Laycock, State RFRA 's and Land Use Regulat7on, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
755, 769-83 (1999) (summarizing evidence from Congressional hearings on RLPA).
51. H.R. REP.No. 106-219, at 24.
52. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18-24;
146 CONG. REC. E1234, E1235 (daily ed. July 14, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
53. See 146 CONG. REC. at S7775; H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18-24.
54. 146 CONG. REC. at S7775; see also H.R. REP. 106-219, at 18-24.
55. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18.
56. Id. at 24; see also id. at 17 ("Local land use regulation, which lacks
objective, generally applicable standards, and instead relies on discretionary,
individualized determinations, presents a problem that Congress has closely
scrutinized and found to warrant remedial measures under its Section 5 enforcement
authority.").
57. Id. at 19.
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virtually unlimited discretion in granting or denying permits for land use
and in other aspects of implementing zoning laws."58
Congress heard evidence that religious institutions frequently
faced both overt and subtle discrimination based on religion in denials of
zoning approval and that "new, small, or unfamiliar churches" were more
likely to face discrimination than larger, established churches.59 Congress
also heard evidence of racial and religious animus in local land-use
decisions, "especially in cases of black churches and Jewish shuls and
synagogues."60 For example, Congress also heard evidence that faith
groups constituting 9% of the population made up 50% of reported court
cases involving zoning disputes.6 The discrimination, Congress found,
was sometimes overt, but often more subtle.62 As the House Report
notes, "the motive is not always easily discernible, but the result is a
consistent, widespread pattern of political and governmental resistance to
a core feature of religious exercise: the ability to assemble for
worship." 63
The problem of mosque construction barely registered in the
RLUIPA hearings and proceedings. In all of the hearing testimony, there
are just two references to cases involving mosques. The House Report
and the Senate Joint Statement address the problems facing churches and
synagogues broadly, and do not once speak of mosques specifically in
the document bodies, although there is a reference to a mosque case in a
footnote to the House Report. This is not to say that the sponsors were
indifferent to minority faiths. As noted above, both the House Report and
the Senate Joint Statement highlighted the plight of minority faiths
generally in obtaining zoning approval, and, in particular, cite to a
58. Id. at 20.
59. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774.
60. Id.
61. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 21.
62. See id. at 23.
63. Id at 24; see also 146 CONG. REC. S7774.
64. See Protecting Religious Freedom After Boeme v. Flores: Hearing Before
the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
35 (July 14, 1997) (statement of Marc Stem, Dir. of Legal Dep't, Am. Jewish
Cong.); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 61 (June 16, 1998)
(testimony of Marc Stem).
65. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 23 n.l I1.
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Brigham Young University study showing that minority faith groups are
66
disproportionately represented in zoning disputes. But Islam was barely
on the radar. Indeed, the record seems to indicate that Congress was
simply reflecting the reality on the ground at the time. The BYU study
found that only 1.6% of reported zoning cases raising free exercise issues
involved Muslims.67 While this is greater than Muslims' percentage of
the population by a factor of 2 or 3,68 it contrasts dramatically with the
experience of Jews, who make up approximately 2% of the population
but accounted for more than 20% of the reported zoning decisions in the
study, or the six-fold overrepresentation of minority religions generally.69
In addition to evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination,
Congress also reviewed evidence that, as a whole, religious institutions
were treated worse than comparable secular institutions.70 As Senators
Kennedy and Hatch noted:
Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places
where they permit theaters, meetings halls, and
other places where large groups of people assemble
for secular purposes . . . . Churches have been
denied the right to meet in rented storefronts, in
abandoned schools, in converted funeral homes,
66. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
67. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the
H. Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 334
(May 12, 1999) (appendix to statement of Von Keetch, Counsel, The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints).
68. The American Religious Identification Survey placed the number of
Muslims in the U.S. in 2001 at 1,104,000, or just over .5% of the population. U.S.
Census Bureau, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (2012). This
survey, which looks at religious self-identification by adults, is used by the U.S.
Census Bureau in its statistics. Other surveys of the Muslim population come in with
higher numbers. For example, a Pew Research Center survey estimated a U.S.
Muslim population of 2.5 million Muslims in 2008, PEw RESEARCH CENTER,
MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND
DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S MUSLIM POPULATION 24 (2009), while that same
year the American Religious Identification Survey put the number at 1.3 million.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES at 61, http://pewforum.org/
newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf.
69. Von Keetch statement appendix, supra note 67 at 33.
70. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
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theaters and skating rinks-in all sorts of buildings
that were permitted when they generated traffic for
71
secular purposes.
Based on the evidence before it of a "pattern of abusive and
discriminatory actions by land use authorities who have imposed
substantial burdens on religious exercise," 72 Congress determined that
there was a need to pass legislation, under its Commerce, Spending, and
Enforcement Clause powers, to protect against the infringement of
religious liberty in land use.73 As the Senate sponsors observed: "The
right to assemble for worship is at the very core of the free exercise of
religion. Churches and synagogues cannot function without a physical
space adequate to their needs and consistent with their theological
requirements."74
Congress passed RLUIPA in July of 2000 by unanimous
75 . 76
consent. Its House and Senate sponsors were ideologically diverse,
and RLUIPA was supported by more than seventy religious and civil
rights groups representing a great diversity of religious and ideological
viewpoints.77 As Representative Nadler noted in his remarks on the
House floor, "Every religious group that I am aware of supports this bill.
I am aware of no opposition from any religious or civil rights or civil
71. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 19-20 ("[u]ses such as banquet
halls, clubs, community centers, funeral parlors, fraternal organizations, health clubs,
gyms, places of amusement, recreation centers, lodges, libraries, museums,
municipal buildings, meeting halls, and theaters are often permitted as of right in
zones where churches require a special use permit, or permitted on special use
permit where churches are wholly excluded").
72. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 17.
73. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (describing Congressional
authority); see also 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Canady).
74. 146 CONG. REC. at S7774.
75. Id. at S7774-01.
76. The sponsors included, in addition to Senators Hatch and Kennedy,
Senators Charles Schumer, Mike Crapo, Joe Lieberman, and Robert Bennett, former
Senators Gordon Smith, Tom Daschle and Tim Hutchinson, Representatives Jerrold
Nadler, Barney Frank, Sanford Bishop, Lee Terry, Roy Blunt, Chet Edwards, and
Robert Wexler, and former Representatives Charles Canady and Merrill Cook. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF RLUIPA, supra
note 11, at 4 n.14 (Sept. 22, 2010).
77. See 146 CONG. REC. S7777-78 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
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liberties group." The Department of Justice gave its "strong support" to
the bill and worked closely with House and Senate Judiciary Committee
staffs on the drafting and refining the bill.79 RLJIPA was signed into law
by President Clinton on September 22, 2000.
RLUIPA's land use section codifies the constitutional
protections for religious freedom and against religious discrimination
provided under the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and
the Equal Protection Clause, and provides mechanisms for enforcement
of these rights.8 1 The land use section contains five separate provisions,
which together provide comprehensive protection for individuals and
religious institutions from zoning and landmarking laws that discriminate
based on religion or unjustifiably infringe on religious freedom.82
Section 2(a) prohibits land use regulations that impose a
"substantial burden" on the religious exercise of a person or institution,
unless the government can show that it has a "compelling interest" for
imposing the burden and that the regulations further that interest in the
83..least restrictive way. In recognition of the constitutional limits on
Congressional power articulated in the Boerne decision,84 this section
limits its reach to cases that impact interstate commerce, cases involving
federal funding, or cases in which the government's zoning or
landmarking decision involves "individualized assessment[]" of the
proposed use. This last jurisdictional basis enforces the free exercise
principle identified in the Smith decision that where the government had
in place a system of making individualized assessments, the government
cannot deny relief where doing so would impose a substantial burden on
86
religious exercise (absent meeting strict scrutiny).
Section 2(b)(1) provides that religious assemblies and
institutions must be treated at least as well as nonreligious assemblies
and institutions, and is based on the nondiscrimination principles of the
78. Id. at S7776.
79. Id. at S7776 (letter from Assistant Att'y Gen. Robert Raben).
80. See REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF RLUIPA, supra note 11, at 2.
81. 146 CONG. REC. S7775-76 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
83. Id. at § 2000cc(a)(1).
84. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
86. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
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Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the Free Speech
clause's requirement of neutrality toward religion.87 Where 2(b)(1)
focuses on discrimination against religious compared to nonreligious
land uses, Section 2(b)(2) is aimed at discrimination on the basis of
religion or religious denomination, which is "the most invidious form of
free exercise violation" and also violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, Sections 2(b)(3)(A) and (B) are directed at jurisdictions
that either totally or unreasonably exclude religious assemblies from a
jurisdiction.89 These two provisions are intended to track Supreme Court
free speech precedents regarding attempts by local government to zone
out particular speech categories. 90 RLUIPA allows aggrieved persons to
bring lawsuits and also authorizes the Attorney General to bring suit for
injunctive relief.9'
These provisions collectively prohibit local governments from
discriminating against religious land uses, and protect individuals,
religious institutions, and religious assemblies from "unnecessary
92
government interference" with the free exercise of religion. As
President Clinton said upon signing the Act into law, "Religious liberty
is a constitutional value of the highest order, and the Framers of the
Constitution included protection for the free exercise of religion in the
very first Amendment. This Act recognizes the importance the free
exercise of religion plays in our democratic society."
II. INCREASING DISPUTES, INCREASING ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF
RLUIPA ON MOSQUE CONSTRUCTION CONTROVERSIES AFTER 9/11
RLUIPA has been successful in fulfilling the goals of its
sponsors and supporters to reinvigorate the protection of religious
94
exercise in land use and ensure that constitutional rights are enforced.
As a Department of Justice report on the Tenth Anniversary of RLUIPA
87. See, e.g., Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 40 at 968.
88. Id. at 972.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3).
90. See 146 CONG. REC. at S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(t).
92. 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000).
93. REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF RLUIPA, supra note 11, at 2.
94. Id. at 5-6.
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concluded, "RLUIPA has had a dramatic impact in its first ten years on
protecting the religious freedom of and preventing religious
discrimination against and individuals and institutions seeking to
exercise their religions through construction, expansion, and use of
property." The report found that RLUIPA has been used to protect
religious exercise in a wide range of settings, including places of
worship, religious schools, prayer meetings in private homes, and faith-
based social services such as homeless shelters, group homes, and soup
kitchens.96 The report also found that cases under the land use provisions
of RLUIPA had benefited a wide range of religious groups.97 Similarly, a
Harvard Law Review Note in 2007, surveying the application of
RLUIPA since in the first years since its enactment, concluded that
"[s]ince the advent of RLUIPA, religious land use plaintiffs have been
more successful in the federal courts than ever before."98
RLUIPA came at a critical time for Muslim Americans. Less
than one year after its passage, the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred. It is
often said, when talking about subjects ranging from our collective
feelings of security to foreign policy, that "9/11 changed everything."
This is demonstrably true with regard to the civil rights of Muslim
Americans. Prior to 9/11, hate crimes against Muslims, while they did
occur from time to time, barely registered in statistics. In 2000, for
example, there were twenty-eight hate crime incidents against Muslims
reported in the FBI Hate Crimes report, in contrast to 1,109 anti-Jewish
hate crimes reported the same year.99 When I speak to veteran hate crime
prosecutors, they tell me that before 9/11 Muslim cases were barely on
the radar screen. In the wake of 9/11, there was a violent backlash
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. (collecting cases).
97. Id.
98. Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120
HARv. L. REv. 2178, 2188 (2007).
99. FBI, HATE CRIME STATISTICs 7 (2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2000.
100. This discussion of aggregate patterns should not understate the
seriousness of individual crimes and their impact on victims and their families. For
example, Alex Odeh, the regional director of the American Arab-Anti
Discrimination Committee in California, was murdered by a letter bomb in 1985, a
case that remains unsolved despite a $1 million FBI reward. See FBI, Seeking
Information, http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/seeking-info/alexander-michel-odeh.
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against Muslims and Arabs, and persons perceived to be Muslim or
Arab, including Sikhs and South Asians.' 0 These included arsons and
attempted arsons of mosques, a Sikh Gurdwara, and businesses, as well
as threats, assaults, and even murder.102 Two days after 9/11, for
example, Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh gas station owner, was murdered in
a drive by shooting while pumping gas. o3 In Seattle, Washington, a man
set fire to cars outside a mosque, then shot at congregants as they ran
outside.'O The Department of Justice investigated more than 300 such
incidents in the three months after 9/11.'s For 2001, the number of anti-
Muslim hate crimes recorded in the FBI hate crime statistics jumped to
481 from 28 the prior year.ios
The backlash has not been limited to hate crimes. Charges of
religion-based discrimination filed by Muslims with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") have jumped almost
threefold from the eleven year period before 9/11 to the eleven year
period after. 0 7 Although Muslims make up from 1% to 2% of the
population in the United States, they now make up one fourth of the
religious discrimination claims filed with the EEOC. os
Despite mosques barely registering in the legislative history of
RLUIPA, as discussed in Section I above, land use disputes involving
101. See Treene, supra note 9, at 189.
102. Id. at 189-90.
103. Id. at 190.
104. See Civil Rights Division, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Initiative to Combat
Post 9-11 Backlash: Enjorcement and Outreach, http://www.justice.gov/
crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.php.
105. Treene, supra note 9, at 189-90.
106. Compare Hale Crime Statistics, FBI, 9 (2001), http://fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2001 with Hate Crime Statistics, FBI, 7 (2000),
http://fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2000.
107. EEOC, Fact Sheet, Backlash Employment Discrimination Charges
related to the events of 9/11/2001 against individuals who are, or are perceived to
be, Muslim, Arab, Afghani, Middle Eastern or South Asian (Sept. 11, 2011). Part of
that increase may be attributable to increased outreach by EEOC field offices and
greater awareness among Muslims of their rights.
108. Written Statement, ACLU, Laura W. Murphy and Michael Macleod Ball,
Protecting the Civil Rights of American Muslims, S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights (Mar. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/March_2011 _Hearingon Muslim CivilRightsSt
atement.pdf.
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mosques became a prominent part of the RLUIPA enforcement story.109
While Muslims make up an estimated 1% to 2% of the population, 14%
of RLUIPA investigations opened by the Civil Rights Division in
RLUIPA's first ten years involved mosques or Muslim schools."o The
ACLU has identified sixty disputes involving mosques in just the last
five years, offering a sharp contrast to the two cases identified in
RLUIPA's legislative history.112 While certainly not a dominant feature
of reported RLUIPA cases, there have been at least five reported court
. . ..113decisions involving mosques.
And while the rate of hate crimes has dropped sharply from the
highs following 9/11, land use disputes appear to be on the rise.114 Of the
twenty-seven RLUIPA matters involving mosques or Islamic schools
that the Department of Justice has opened since 9/11, seventeen have
109. REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF RLUIPA, supra note 11, at 6.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Map - Nationwide Anti-Mosque Activity, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/
maps/map-nationwide-anti-mosque-activity (last visited Feb 2, 2012).
112. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
113. See Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648 (D. Md. 2009);
Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-CV-3217 (PGS), 2007 WL
2904194 (D. N.J. Oct. 1, 2007); AI-Salam Mosque Found. v. City of Palos Heights,
No. 00C4596, 2002 WL 535046 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2002); Muslim Ctr. of Somerset
Cty. v. Borough of Somerville Zoning Bd., 2006 WL 3040808 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct.
17, 2006) (unpublished); Islamic Cultural Ctr. of Monticello, Inc. v. Vill. of
Monticello, 29 Misc.3d 1223(a) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
114. The FBI hate crimes statistics show a sharp drop from the spike
immediately after 9/11 to present levels, yielding a clear conclusion that the rate has
gone down, but it is more difficult to discern the pattem for the years 2002 to the
present. See Hate Crime Statistics, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr, follow
"Hate Crime Statistics" portion and select year (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). The
number of incidents dropped from 481 incidents in 2001-mostly in the last three
and half months of that year-to 155 in 2002. See id. From 2002 to 2006, the
number of incidents ranged from 128 to 156. See id. Then for 2007, 2008, and 2009
the number of incidents have been 115, 105, and 107, respectively. See id In
contrast to this trend, 2010 saw a 50% increase in incidents, up to 160, a figure near
2002 levels. See id Pew Research Center polling data shows a steady number of
Muslims reporting being physically attacked or threatened, with 4% reporting
attacks or threats in 2007 and 6% in 2011. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM
AMERICANS: No SIGN OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM 46
(Aug. 2011), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-American-
Report.pdf.
been opened since May of 2010. Some of these cases involve allegations
of overt bias. In two mosque cases settled by consent decree in
September of 2011, for example, the United States alleged that local
government officials directly involved in the zoning process had made
hostile statements toward Muslims, and acted in furtherance of their own
bias as well as the bias of constituents." 5 The Pew Forum on Religion
and Public life has identified thirty-seven mosque disputes in the last
three years.'16 Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Perez, testified
before a Senate subcommittee in March of 2011 that the Civil Rights
Division has seen an increase in RLUIPA cases and investigations
involving mosques and that "[w]e believe this reflects a regrettable
increase in anti-Muslim sentiment."" 7 Farhana Khera, President of
Muslim Advocates, the advocacy affiliate of the National Association of
Muslim Lawyers, also testified at the same hearing of growing anti-
Muslim sentiment being reflected in opposition to mosques." One study
of land use issues involving mosques put it this way:
Resistance to mosque proposals over the last
decade was tame by comparison to what we see
today. Protest, even if bruising, at least took place
115. See United States v. Cnty. of Henrico, Va., No. 3:11-CV-583 HEH (E.D.
Va. Sept. 6, 2001) (consent decree filed Sept. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/henricocomp.pdf; United States v.
City of Lilburn, Ga., No. 1:11-CV-02871-JOF (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2011), 4-7
(consent decree filed Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
hce/documents/lilburncomp.pdf. The County and the City in each of these cases
denied the allegations in the complaints.
116. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Controversies Over Mosques and
Islamic Centers Across the U.S., PEW FORUM (Sept. 29, 2011) http://features.
pewforum.org/muslim/controversies-over-mosque-and-islamic-centers-across-the-
us.html.
117. Protecting the Civil Rights of Muslim Americans: Hearing before the H.
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (March 29, 2011) (statement of Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Att'y Gen. of the Civil Rights Div.), available at http://durbin.senate.gov/
public/index.cfn/files/serve?File id=75d9d983-a7db-4e76-8d90-953484b644ec.
118. Id. at 11- 13 (statement of Farhana Khera, President & Exec. Dir., Muslim
Advocates), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/l 1-3-29%2OKhera%20
Testimony.pdf. See also id. at 2 ("There has been . . . a rampant increase in anti-
Muslim harassment, discrimination, opposition to mosques, and hate crimes
targeting Muslim, Arab, Sikh and South Asian Americans.").
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in the controlled environment of public sessions
and within the framework of public debate-
Muslim American applicants had the opportunity to
respond to accusations and counter speculation
with facts. Now, however, a vocal and organized
opposition is in the streets with placards and
bullhorns .... 119
This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence I hear from Muslim
community leaders: while hate crimes are down from the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, there is an uneasiness in Muslim communities that
anti-Muslim sentiment has broadened, and that this is being reflected in
mosque controversies. And while the general trend has been a sharp
reduction in hate crimes since the months following 9/11, the number of
hate crimes against Muslims reported by the FBI jumped 50% from 2009
to 2010, a development that merits watching.120
Survey data support the conclusion that there has been a rise in
anti-Muslim sentiment. The Pew Research Center found that from 2007
to 2011, the number of Muslims who report being called offensive names
in the most recent twelve months rose from 15% to 22%, and those
reporting physical threats or attacks rose from 4% to 6%.121 Pew has on
several occasions polled the general public's favorable/unfavorable view
of Muslims, and found that the favorable views of Muslims slipped from
47% in 2002 to 43% in 2007.122 A 2009 Gallup poll found that 43% of
119. Kathleen E. Foley, "Not In Our Neighborhood": Managing Opposition to
Mosque Construction, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND UNDERSTANDING 8-9
(October 2010), available at http://ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU Not In Our Neighborhood
KathleenFoley.pdf.
120. Compare HATE CRIME STATISTICS, FBI, Table 1 (2009), http://www2.fbi.
gov/ucr/hc2009/index.html, with HATE CRIME STATISTICS, FBI, Table 1 (2010),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010.
121. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 114, at 108.
122. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE & THE PEW RESEARCH
CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, VIEwS OF RELIGIOUS SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES, MUSLIMS WIDELY SEEN AS FACING DISCRIMINATION 22 (2009),
available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/ 1336/perceptions-of-islam-religious-
similarities-differences. Indeed, the favorability rating in 2009 dropped to 37%, but
the report indicates that due to an usually large "no response" figure in the survey,
that 37% figure is suspect. Id. The numbers improve when researchers ask about
opinion of "Muslim Americans" rather than just Muslims. Id. While "Muslims" had
3472012] RLUIPA AND MOSQUES
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Americans report "a great deal," "some," or "a little" prejudice toward
MuslimS.123 Results in the same poll for prejudice toward Christians were
18%, toward Jews 13%, and toward Buddhists 14% .124
Focusing on opinion regarding land use issues reveals similar
results. A November of 2010 USA Networks poll found that 38% of
respondents would oppose a mosque in their neighborhood, compared to
the 34% who would oppose a Scientology center, 24% who would
oppose a Mormon temple, 13% who would oppose a synagogue, and 8%
who would oppose a church.125 Another survey found that 46% of
respondents would be uncomfortable with a mosque being built near
their home. 26
The anti-Muslim bias in cases we have handled is often overt. In
one Civil Rights Division investigation involving a 2003 denial of a
Muslim school's application for a permit to expand to build a mosque,
we reported that "[t]he proposal met with heated community opposition"
some of which "was based on traffic and congestion concerns," but there
also were "incidents of vandalism at the school and expressions of anti-
a 43/35 favorable/unfavorable rating in 2007, "Muslim Americans" polled at 53/29
favorable/unfavorable. Id. The response for "Muslim Americans" was virtually
identical to that for Mormons (53/27 favorable/unfavorable), though behind Jews
(76/69), Catholics (76/14), and Evangelical Christians (60/19). Id. Both "Muslims"
and "Muslim Americans" poll better than atheists (35/53). See Benedict XVI Viewed
Favorably but Faulted on Religious Outreach: Public Expresses Mixed Views of
Islam, Mormonism, PEW RESEARCH CENTER I (Sept. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.people-press.org/2007/09/25/public-expresses-mixed-views-of-islam-
mormonism/.
123. Religious Perceptions in America: With an In-Depth Analysis of U.S.




125. United or Divided: Americans' Attitude on Unity, Divisions, and
Discrimination in the USA, PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES AND HART RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES 3 (Nov. 2010) (on file with author). The opposition dropped with
personal familiarity with Muslims: 44% of adults who did not know a Muslim
personally opposed a mosque in the neighborhood, but only 26% of those who knew
Muslim opposed a mosque in their neighborhood. Id. at 5.
126. Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, William A. Galston & E.J. Dionne, Jr.,
What it Means to Be An American: Attitudes in an Increasingly Diverse America Ten
Years After 9/11, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE & PUBLIC RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
14 (Sept. 6, 2011).
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Muslim sentiment.,,127 The case was resolved after DOJ mediation. 12In
United States v. City of Lilburn, Georgia,129 settled by consent decree in
September of 2011, the complaint alleged that: (1) the city raised its
minimum acreage requirement for places of worship in commercial
districts after a mosque discussed expansion plans with the city; (2) it did
the same thing in residential districts in 2003 after becoming aware that
another Muslim group wanted to build a mosque; that city residents
expressed hostility to the mosque; (3) "City officials directly involved in
the Islamic Center's attempts to obtain [a permit] have made hostile
remarks about Muslims and members of the Islamic Center" 130 ; and (4)
"[t]he City was motivated to deny the Islamic Center's applications ...
to effectuate the desires expressed by City residents and City officials
who were hostile to and had animus towards the Islamic Center and its
members on the basis of religion or religious denomination."13 1
Similarly, in United States v. County ofHenrico, Virginia,132 also
resolved by consent decree in September of 2011, the complaint alleged
that "some County residents have communicated their hostility to the
Mosque's plan to obtain rezoning by making comments and sending
communications to County officials expressing hostility to the Mosque
on the basis of religion or religious denomination. The complaint
further alleged that "County officials directly involved in the Mosque's
attempts to obtain rezoning have discriminated against the Mosque on
the basis of religion on religious denomination, including making
derogatory and discriminatory statements, and/or treating the Mosque's
127. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., Morton Grove, IL, Grants
Special Use Permit for School After DOJ Mediation, 8 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
Focus (Nov./Dec. 2004); available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec
topics/religiousdiscrimination/newsletter/focus_8.htm.
128. Id.
129. No. 1:11-cv-02871-JOF (N.D. Ga. Aug 26, 2011), http://www.justice.gov
/crt/about/hce/documents/lilbumsettle.pdf (providing consent order).
130. Complaint at 7, City of Lilburn, Ga., No. 1:11 -cv-0287 1 -JOF (Doc. No.
1545), available at http://www.justice.gov/crtlabout/hce/
documents/lilbumsettle.pdf.
13 1. Id. at 7. The defendants denied the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 4-7.
132. No. 3:11-cv-583-HEH (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov
/crt/about/hce/documents/henricocomp.pdf (providing consent order).
133. Complaint, Cnty. of Henrico, Va., No. 3:11 -cv-583-HEH available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/henricocomp.pdf.
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application less favorably than similar applications by non-Muslim
houses of worship."' 34
A particularly vivid case of anti-Muslim bias is Estes v.
Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission. m There, a mosque
in Murfreesboro sought to construct a larger mosque on land it had
purchased in nearby Rutherford County.136 The county approved the
mosque proposal, since places of worship were permitted as of right in
the relevant zone.'37 The mosque met with vociferous community
opposition, including the spray-painting of "not welcome" on a
construction sign, the destruction of a second sign, a firebombing of
construction equipment at the site, and most recently, a bomb threat. 138
Several county residents brought suit against the county, alleging
139
violation of their Due Process rights in the approval of the mosque.
One of their arguments was that the county should not have treated the
mosque as it would have a church, because Islam is an ideology, rather
than a religion, and thus a mosque is not a place of worship but a
nonreligious assembly.140 The United States filed an amicus brief noting
that the Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch have all
recognized Islam as a religion, and that Islam easily meets the tests
courts have employed for determining whether something is a religion or
not. 141 The brief thus concluded that the county's "failing to treat
mosques equally with churches as a category in application of its zoning
134. Id at 4-5. The defendants denied the allegations in the complaint.
135. No. 10CV-1443 (Ch. Ct. for Rutherford Cnty. Oct 18, 2010), http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/murfreesboro-amicus_10-18-10.pdf (providing
motion by United States).
136. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Estes, No. IOCV-1443,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec topics/religiousdiscrimination/rutherford-amicus-br
ief.pdf.
137. Memorandum Opinion at 5, Fisher v. Rutherford Cnty., No IOCV-1443
(Ch. Court, 16th Judicial Dist. 2011).
138. The FBI is currently investigating these matters. See Protecting the Civil
Rights of Muslim Americans, supra note 117, at 12. The conflict is recounted in a
CNN documentary, UNWELCOME, THE MUSLIMS NEXT DOOR (CNN Documentary
2011), available at http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/
us/2011/03/09/unwelcome.the.muslims.next.door.cnn.
139. Brief for the United States, supra note 136, at 12.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id. at 5, 11.
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laws would be a facial violation of Section 2(b)(2) of RLUI[P]A."l42 The
court agreed that there was no basis for treating the mosque differently,
and dismissed the complaint.143
Mosque disputes appear to be on the increase, and RLUIPA has
proven to be an important tool in ensuring enforcement of Muslims'
constitutional rights. The sample of cases is too small to make any broad
conclusions about RLUIPA's impact on outcomes, however. The
Department of Justice has brought two mosque investigations that
resulted in favorable outcomes without filing lawsuits,144 filed two
mosque lawsuits resulting in consent decrees, 145 and filed amicus briefs
1 46in two mosque cases, both of which resulted in favorable rulings.
While the sample is small, these cases suggest that RLUIPA can be an
important statute for Muslim congregations seeking to protect their
constitutional rights in land use disputes, just as RLUIPA has been
shown to be for religious congregations generally in its first ten years.147
This application of RLUIPA is likely to increase as the number of
mosque controversies increase. Section III below will explore how the
individual substantive provisions of RLUIPA will apply in cases
involving mosques going forward, examining cases with issues that raise
similar issues to mosque cases. The experience of courts with these cases
can offer a window into how these issues are likely to play out in mosque
controversies.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Estes v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 1OCV-1443 (Ch. Ct. for Rutherford Cnty.
Oct 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/murfreesboro_
amicus_10-18-I0.pdf.
144. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., supra note 127; DOJ
Closes RLUIPA Investigation After Illinois Village Allows Mosque Expansion 32
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN Focus (Mar./Apr. 2008), available at http://www.justice.
gov/crt/spectopics/religiousdiscrimination/newsletter/focus 32.htm.
145. See Consent Order, supra note 129; Consent Order supra note 132.
146. Brief for the United States, supra note 136, at 1-2; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Albanian Assoc. Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 2:06-cv-
3217 (D. N.J. 2007), 2007 WL 2904194.
147. See REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF RLUIPA, supra note 11, at
2.
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III. APPLICATION OF RLUIPA's SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS IN ITS FIRST
DECADE
RLUIPA, reflecting the complexity of the various constitutional
provisions and doctrines protecting religious liberty in the land use
context, has four separate operative provisions which protect against
infringements on constitutional values in different ways.148 In the eleven
years since RLUIPA's enactment, courts have made determinations
under each of these provisions, providing greater guidance regarding
how they will apply in different factual settings. Some provisions, such
as the Substantial Burden and Equal Terms provisions, have been the
subjects of considerably more case law. There is very little case law
specifically involving mosques. However, patterns of decision have
emerged that give some understanding of how RLUIPA may be expected
to protect the religious liberty of Muslims in land use matters in the years
ahead.
1. Section 2(a): Substantial Burden
Section 2(a) of RLUIPA prevents government action that
"substantially burdens" religious exercise without a compelling
justification pursued through the least restrictive means. 149 As discussed
in the RLUIPA history section above,5 o it enforces the free exercise
balancing test of cases such as Sherbert v. Verner.m
The substantial burden section does not require any showing of
discrimination or animus.152 However, it nonetheless has an important
role in prohibiting religious discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, for example, found in Sts. Constantine and Helen
Greek Orthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 53 that a Greek Orthodox
148. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (1994).
150. See supra Section I.
151. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
153. 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States filed a brief and argued
as amicus in the case. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Helen Greek
Orthodox Church, 396 F.3d 895 (No. 04-2326), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec topics/religious
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church's religious exercise was substantially burdened by zoning denials
that created "delay, uncertainty and expense" for the congregation.1 54
There was no well-developed evidence of discrimination in the case,
though the court noted that the target parcel was bordered on one side by
a Protestant church and on the other by a piece of land for which another
Protestant church had been granted a permit to build,155 and noted the
"whiff of bad faith" in the City's actions. 156 The court found there was a
violation of the substantial burden provision. The court explained that:
the "substantial burden" provision backstops the
explicit prohibition of religious discrimination in
the later section of [RLUIPA], much as the
disparate-impact theory of employment
discrimination backstops the prohibition of
intentional discrimination . . . . If a land-use
decision . . . imposes a substantial burden on
religious exercise . . . , and the decision maker
cannot justify it, the inference arises that hostility
to religion, or more likely to a particular sect,
influenced the decision.'57
The Ninth Circuit similarly, in Guru Nanak Sikh Society v.
County of Sutter,"' found a county to have created a substantial burden
on a Sikh congregation's religious exercise by denying successive
permits for construction of a Sikh place of worship, called a Gurdwara. 5 9
In that case, the congregation had applied first in the residential district,
but was denied because its use was said to be incompatible with other
uses. 1o It then applied in the agricultural district, only to get the same
answer, despite its willingness to modify its plans to address the county's
discrimination/St.Constantine.Amicus.Brief Of.United.States.pdf.
154. City ofNew Berlin, 396 F.3d at 901.
155. 1d. at 898.
156. Id. at 901.
157. Id. at 900.
158. 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). The United States filed a brief and argued
as amicus in the case. See Brief for United States as Intervenor and Amicus Curiae,
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y, 456 F.3d 978 (No.03-17343), available at http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/gurunanak.pdf
159. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc y, 456 F.3d at 991-92.
160. See id. at 989.
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stated concerns.161 The court held that the county's repeated denials
substantially burdened the congregation's free exercise of religion.162
Substantial burden similarly was at issue in a case involving a
congregation's efforts to build a mosque on an eleven-acre plot it owned
in Wayne Township, New Jersey. As in the Seventh and Ninth Circuit
cases, there was no overt evidence of disc-imination.64 However, the
Township, while the mosque's zoning application was being processed,
began eminent domain proceedings to take the congregation's land to
leave it as open space.165 Analyzing the burden on the congregation, the
court noted the growth of the congregation from 100 individuals to over
200 families, and the current mosque's inadequacy in terms of lack of
space for religious education, insufficient worship space, and lack of
facilities for ritual washing before prayers, and concluded that a fact
finder "could reasonably determine that the Township's actions have
created a substantial burden on the mosque." 66 The court thus denied the
Township's motion for summary judgment.167
The key threshold question in Section 2(a) cases is whether a
burden on religion is in fact "substantial." 68 Although courts interpreting
the section have looked to Supreme Court decisions under the Free
Exercise Clause to determine when a burden is substantial, their precise
formulations have varied. Generally, in order for a burden on religious
exercise to be "substantial" under RLUIPA, it must create significant
69
restriction or hardship on religious exercise, rather than just a mere
inconvenience, minor cost, or incidental effect. 170 For example, actions
by a local government that effectively bar use of a particular property for
161. See id. at 990.
162. Id. at 992.
163. See Albanian Assoc. Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-CV-3217 (PGS),
2000 WL 2904194, at *7 (D. N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
164. See id. at *ll.
165. Id. at *3.
166. Id. at *10.
167. Id. at *44.
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (1996).
169. See, e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988
(9th Cir. 2006).
170. See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 999 (7th Cir.
2006); Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (1 Ith Cir. 2004).
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religious activity,"' impose a significantly great restriction on religious
use of a property,172 or that create significant delay, uncertainty, or
expense in constructing or expanding a religious assembly or
institution, can be substantial burdens. Some examples of things that
have been found to be substantial burdens on religious exercise under
RLUIPA have included denial of a Jewish religious school's vitally
needed expansion for arbitrary reasons,174 denial of a church construction
permit due to unreasonable off-street parking requirements,'17 and denial
of approval of construction for a parish center.176
As with other faith groups, growing Muslim congregations face
burdens from lack of adequate worship space as well as lack of space for
fellowship and educational activities. In the Henrico County case, the
United States alleged that the current worship facilities lacked sufficient
space for the congregation to worship at the same time, lacked facilities
for ritual ablutions before prayer, and lacked a space for educating
children.177 Similarly, in Lilburn, the United States identified burdens
including lack of adequate space, lack of facilities for ablutions, lack of a
nursery, and the inability to attract a full-time imam without a residence
on site.
After a substantial burden is established, the burden shifts to the
defendants to prove that the government action is supported by a
compelling government interest pursued in the least restrictive means.m
"Compelling interest" means interests "of the highest order": government
171. Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App'x
729, 737 (6th Cir. 2007); DiLaura v. Ann Arbor, 112 F. App'x 445, 446 (6th Cir.
2004).
172. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y, 456 F.3d at 988.
173. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir.
2007); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y, 456 F.3d at 992; Sts. Constantine and Helen Greek
Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005).
174. Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352-53.
175. Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God v. City of Southfield, 2007 WL 30280,
at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
176. Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, No. 05-40220, 424 F.
Supp. 2d 309, 322 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 2006).
177. Complaint, supra note 133 at 2-3.
178. Complaint, supra note 130 at 3-4.
179. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 542 (1993).
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interests that are merely reasonable or important are insufficient. go For
example, revenue generation and eliminating congestion,182 though
they may be important, have been held not to be compelling interests.
2. Section 2(b) (1): "Equal Terms" Requirement
RLUIPA's legislative history pointed to the problems of
"[z]oning codes frequently exclud[ing] churches in places where they
permit theaters, meetings halls, and other places where large groups of
people assemble for secular purposes." 83 Section 2(b)(1) of RLUIPA,
known as the "equal terms" provision, addresses this problem by
providing that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution." 8 4 This
section applies to ordinances that treat religious assemblies or institutions
on less than equal terms on their face, as well as ordinances that,
185
although facially neutral, are applied in a non-neutral manner.
Determining if a religious assembly is treated on "less than equal
terms" than a secular assembly or institution requires a comparison of
how the two types of entities are treated in a zoning code and in its
application.186 Courts have differed regarding precisely how such a
187
comparison is made, and have incorporated different tests. Factual
situations in which courts have found the equal terms section violated
180. See id.
181. See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1228-29 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
182. Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp. 2d 309, 324
(D. Mass. 2006).
183. 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000).
184. 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(b)(1) (2006).
185. See, e.g., Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005)
(as applied); Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232-33 (11th
Cir. 2004) (facially invalid).
186. See Third Church of Christ, Scientist v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667,
669 (2d Cir. 2010).
187. See, e.g., Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651
F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest,
611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long
Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2007); Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d 1214.
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have included a city allowing "membership organizations (except
religious organizations)"" ; a city forbidding places of worship but
allowing private clubs; "9 a city forbidding religious assemblies but
allowing auditoriums, assembly halls, community centers, senior citizen
190
centers, civic clubs, day care centers, and other assemblies; and a
village forbidding places of worship but allowing community centers,
fraternal associations, and political club.191
The Equal Terms cases in the courts have tended to involve
minority religious groups or newer, independent Christian churches
seeking to move from temporary locations to more permanent spaces in
rental spaces, offices, or other nontraditional spaces, rather than building
freestanding structures.192 Muslim congregations seeking to build in
urban and built-up suburban areas could likely fit this fact pattern. Since
the Muslim population in the U.S. is growing, 19 3 and a plurality of U.S.
Muslims attend mosque weekly or more frequently,19 4 there likely will be
188. Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1166.
189. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1231; Vietnamese Buddhism Study
Temple in Am. v. City of Garden Grove, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 (C.D. Cal.
2006).
190. Digrugilliers v. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir.
2007).
191. Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 847 (7th
Cir. 2007).
192. See, e.g., Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1165 (seeking to locate Hispanic
church in former J.C. Penny store); Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 368 (describing church
with sixty-seven members seeking to meet in building in commercial district);
Digrugilliers, 506 F.3d at 614 (discussing church of thirty to fifty members leasing
space in commercial zone); Petra Presbyterian Church, 489 F.3d at 847 (discussing
Korean church seeking to locate in warehouse); Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1220
(pertaining to small Jewish congregation leasing space above a bank); Congregation
Etz Chaim v. City of L.A., No. CV 10-1587 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2011) (discussing
small synagogue denied permit to locate in house), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec-topics/religiousdiscrimination/rff47.2etzchaim-psj
ruling.pdf; Vietnamese Buddhism, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (seeking permit to use of
former medical offices as temple, and eventually construct new facility).
193. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 61 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/
pop.pdf (showing 156% increase in Muslim population from 1990 to 2008).
194. 47% of Muslims in the United States attend mosque once a week or more,
which is on a par with Christians in the United States. 34% of Muslims attend
increased situations where the Equal Terms section of RLUIPA becomes
relevant for Muslim congregations in the coming years.
3. Section 2(b)(2): Discrimination
Section 2(b)(2) of RLUIPA makes it unlawful to discriminate
based on religion or religious denomination.195 While numerous cases
have been brought under RLUIPA alleging intentional discrimination,
most courts in these cases have not had occasion to rule under 2(b)(2)
because the courts provided relief to the plaintiffs under other sections of
RLUIPA or the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, or because
the cases were settled by consent decrees.
For example, in Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner,196 the district
court found "overwhelming evidence of . . . intentional delay, hostility,
and bias toward the Church's application," but determined that since it
found that RLUIPA Section 2(a)(1) was violated, it did not need to rule
on the church's 2(b)(2) claim.1 97 Likewise, in Reaching Hearts
International v. Prince George's County,198 a jury found intentional
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and RLUIPA
Section 2(a),199 and the court of appeals upheld the verdict, finding that
"the evidence presented at trial of the County's anti-church animus was
very strong."200
A case that did interpret the meaning of 2(b)(2) explicitly is
United States v. Village of Airmont,201 a case brought by the Justice
Department alleging that a New York village had enacted a bar on
boarding schools specifically to target Hasidic Jewish boarding
mosque monthly or yearly, and nineteen percent seldom or never. See PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 114, at 26.
195. 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(b)(2) (2006).
196. 734 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
197. Id. at 503, 522-23.
198. 584 F. Supp. 2d 766 (D. Md. 2008), aff'd, 368 F. App'x 370, 372 (4th
Cir. 2010).
199. Id. at 781.
200. Reaching Hearts, 368 F. App'x at 372.
201. No. 05 CIV 5520 (SCR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/nce/documents/airmontsettle.pdf (providing consent order).
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schools.202 In denying the village's motion to dismiss, the court held that
Section 2(b)(2) would be violated if the village's rule against boarding
schools was enacted with the intent of disadvantaging a particular
203
religious group. The case was resolved by consent decree in May of
2011. 204
I am not aware of any mosque case involving 2(b)(2) that has
been decided by a court. As previously noted, the United States alleged
violation of 2(b)(2) in Lilburn and Henrico, but these cases were
resolved by consent decree concurrent with the filing of the
205
complaints, so there was no occasion for the courts to rule on the issue.
While there is very little guidance on how courts will interpret religious
discrimination claims under RLUIPA, the large body of case law
involving intentional racial discrimination in the Fair Housing Act
context and other statutes is likely to provide guidance to courts. In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
206Corporation, for example, in order to determine if a zoning action was
motivated by racially discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court looked to
whether the action had a discriminatory or segregative effect, the
historical background of the action, the sequence of events leading up to
the challenged actions, and whether there were any departures from
,207
normal or substantive criteria.
4. Section 2(b) (3): Total Exclusion and Unreasonable Exclusion
This provision bars actions that totally or unreasonably limit
religious assemblies in a particular jurisdiction.208 Section 2(b)(3) has
only been applied in a small number of cases. One court described a
violation of this section as a local zoning code or regulation that, "as
applied or implemented, has the effect of depriving . . . religious
202. Id. at 18.
203. Id. at 18-19.
204. United States v. Vill. of Airmont, No. 05 Civ. 5520 (LAK)(PED) (consent
decree entered May 6, 2011) (accessible at www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/
documents/airmontsettle.pdf).
205. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
206. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
207. See id.
208. Id. at 265-68.
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institutions or assemblies of reasonable opportunities to practice their
religion, including the use and construction of structures." 209 Another
court observed that what will be reasonable or unreasonable depends on
a review of all of the facts in a particular jurisdiction, including the
availability of land and the economics of religious organizations. 2 10 This
provision is not likely to impact mosques more or less than any other
religious institution, except for the fact previously noted that mosques,
like small independent churches and the houses of worship of minority
religious, are more likely to be in the position of attempting to move into
new locations, compared to established churches that either have
sufficient facilities or are merely seeking to expand existing facilities.
CONCLUSION
RLUIPA has proven to be an important tool for enforcing the
constitutional rights of religious communities to engage in the basic and
foundational religious activity of building structures in which to engage
in worship and other religious activities. RLUIPA was enacted just
before the outset of what has become a difficult time for Muslim
Americans to exercise this right. RLUIPA has become a significant
vehicle for protecting this right for Muslim Americans, as for all
Americans, and promises to remain so going forward.
The Constitution unequivocally provides the right of mosques to
build on the same basis as other religious institutions, and RLUIPA helps
211
to enforce that right. A ban on minarets, as seen in Switzerland, would
be plainly unconstitutional in the United States, and RLUIPA helps
ensure that such ban could never take place at any level of government. .
However, significant numbers of Americans oppose equal
treatment of mosques, with 25% of Americans saying that communities
should be able to prohibit mosques, and 62% saying Muslims should
209. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder,
605 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 2010), amended and superseded by 613 F.3d
1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2010).
210. Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 990 (7th Cir. 2006).
211. See Nick Coming-Bruce & Steven Erlanger, In Bastion of Tolerance,
Swiss Reject Construction of Minarets on Mosque, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html.
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212have the same right as other groups. As discouraging as such
sentiments are for Americans concerned with upholding the principle of
religious freedom that has been so important to our country throughout
its history, and as palpably as Muslim communities facing community
opposition to particular mosque projects are impacted by such
sentiments, there is cause for optimism. First, those who know a Muslim
personally are much more likely to have positive views of Muslims, and
are much less likely to oppose the building of a mosque in their
213
neighborhood. This suggests that perceptions are likely to improve
moving forward as more people have personal interactions with
Muslims. Second, while certainly negative sentiments toward Muslims
are apparent from opinion polls, and the Pew Research Center found
significant numbers of Muslims have had been called names or had
214
negative statements made to them, a higher number of Muslims in the
same poll report that someone expressed support for them in the past
215year.
Religious liberty is not merely a right in the Constitution, but is a
216principle that is part of our cultural and historical makeup, and
departures from this principle should prove temporary. It is easy today to
forget that throughout the 19th Century, Roman Catholics were subjected
to arson of churches and convents, murder, and assaults because they
were said to belong to an alien immigrant religion that was
217fundamentally incompatible with American democracy. Today
Catholicism is so much a part of American culture that the concerns
driving the nativists of the 19th century seem quaint.
212. See Benedict XVI Viewed Favorably, supra note 122, at 7.
213. See United or Divided, supra note 125, at 4.
214. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 114, at 46.
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, THE LUSTRE
OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1-9 (1998);
ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 94-96 (1990).
217. See KEVIN SEAMUS HASSON, THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG: ENDING THE
CULTURE WARS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA 105-108 (2005); Eric W. Treene, The
Grand Finale is Just the Beginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle Over
Blaine Amendments, 3 ENGAGE 128, 129 (2002), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/
20070404_FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf.
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So, there is good reason for hope for the future, but at the same
time there is conflict on the ground. RLUIPA, unbeknownst to its
sponsors, was perfectly timed to step into the gap to protect a critical
element of religious liberty.
